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What Happens to a Nursing Home Chain 
When Private Equity Takes Over? A 
Longitudinal Case Study
Aline Bos, MSc1 and Charlene Harrington, PhD2
Abstract
We analyzed what happens to a nursing home chain when private equity takes over, with regard to strategy, financial 
performance, and resident well-being. We conducted a longitudinal (2000-2012) case study of a large nursing home chain 
that triangulated qualitative and quantitative data from 5 different data sources. Results show that private equity owners 
continued and reinforced several strategies that were already put in place before the takeover, including a focus on keeping 
staffing levels low; the new owners added restructuring, rebranding, and investment strategies such as establishing new 
companies, where the nursing home chain served as an essential “launch customer.”
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Introduction
Private equity firms own and trade unlisted, private compa-
nies. A central investment strategy of private equity firms is 
the leveraged buyout (LBO), which is characterized by high 
leverage, large management ownership, and active corporate 
governance.1 In an LBO, the private equity firm creates a 
fund that obtains capital commitments from investors such as 
pension plans, insurance companies, and individuals. Using 
the fund’s capital, along with a loan commitment on behalf of 
the fund, the private equity firm acquires a so-called portfolio 
company and holds the portfolio company for approximately 
3 to 7 years.2 During this period, it seeks to increase the value 
of the company, to realize a profit when it sells the company. 
The profits in case of such an “exit” are distributed among the 
fund investors and the private equity firm.3
In the past 2 decades, private equity interventions have 
been the issue of several public debates. Private equity oppo-
nents argue that the increased leverage in LBOs make firms 
short-term oriented. In addition, buyouts would often result 
in a redistribution of wealth from employees to investors.1,4-6 
In contrast, proponents argue that the organizational changes 
in LBOs improve manager’s incentives to maximize value, 
leading to improved company performance.1
Since the 1990s, private equity firms regard the health 
care sector as an attractive investment area.7 The health care 
sector captures approximately 10% of the private equity deal 
activity worldwide, with providers and related services as the 
most popular sub sector (nearly 50% of the total health care 
deal volume). Providers and related services include large 
“healthcare-heavy assets,” the label private equity firms 
apply to “assets with meaningful exposure to reimbursement 
risk.”8 The involvement of private equity firms in health ser-
vices fits into the global movement toward involving the pri-
vate sector to attract capital and to deliver health services.9 
Private equity in health services is most visible in the US 
nursing home industry, where 4 out of the 10 largest for-
profit nursing home chains were purchased by a private 
equity firm in the 2003-2008 period.10 Moreover, in coun-
tries such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, large for-profit nursing home chains are increas-
ingly owned by private equity investors.11 It is therefore very 
relevant to study private equity in nursing homes.
Studies on private equity in US nursing homes show 
mixed outcomes. Pradhan et al12 reported that private equity-
owned nursing homes show better financial performance 
than other for-profit nursing homes, while Cadigan et al13 
found little impact of private investment purchases for the 
financial health. On staffing, Stevenson and Grabowski14 
found reduced nursing home staffing after private equity 
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transactions, but they reported that staffing levels were 
already decreasing prepurchase. Yet another study found 
lower staffing of registered nurses (RNs) in private equity-
owned nursing homes.15 Harrington et al16 found no signifi-
cant changes in staffing levels in the post–private equity 
purchase period, in part because staffing levels in large 
chains were already lower than staffing in other ownership 
groups in the prepurchase period. And while Stevenson and 
Grabowski14 reported no difference in quality, two other 
studies reported significantly higher levels of deficiencies 
after private equity purchases, being an indicator of wors-
ened care quality.15,16 Another study showed that nursing 
homes that underwent chain-related transactions had more 
deficiency citations in the years preceding and following a 
transaction than those nursing homes that maintained com-
mon ownership.17
These mixed findings imply that outcomes may vary, 
depending on private equity owner’s strategies and contex-
tual characteristics of individual portfolio companies. 
Scholars therefore stress that
[there is] a scarcity of cases reporting in any detail on the kind of 
restructuring that takes place in individual companies after they 
are acquired by private equity firms . . . There is a requirement 
for fine-grained research . . . at the micro level.18
They stress the need for “longitudinal studies that chart the 
development and impact of changes” during private equity 
ownership.19
We conducted a longitudinal case study, in a large US 
nursing home chain that is currently private equity-owned. 
We studied the strategies that were executed both before and 
after the acquisition. Furthermore, we examined financial 
performance, as well as quality performance measures over 
time. The central research question was “What happens to a 
nursing home chain when private equity takes over?” Our 
study adds to previous studies on the topic, by focusing on 
“how” private equity is at work in an industry that is taking 
care of frail elderly.
Methods
Case Selection
This foundational study used a longitudinal case study 
(2000-2012) of a private equity-owned US nursing home 
chain, named Golden Living. The company was named 
Beverly Enterprises until the LBO by Fillmore Capital in 
2006. Golden Living owned more than 300 nursing facilities 
in 21 states (source: http://www.goldenlivingcenters.com/
home.aspx [retrieved March 11, 2015]) and additionally 
delivered assisted living, rehabilitation therapy, hospice ser-
vices, group purchasing to health care companies, and health 
care staffing. The company, originally founded in 1963, 
employed about 42 000 employees in 2012. The case study 
methodology allowed for an in-depth, focused analysis of the 
nursing home chain and was ideal for examining a contem-
porary set of events, over which we had little or no control.20 
LBOs are complex phenomena where context is important. 
Little is known about strategies and results after LBOs in 
nursing homes, and a case study approach is well suited as an 
exploratory and exemplifying analysis. We believe this is 
one of the first in-depth case studies on the private equity 
phenomenon in general, and the very first in the nursing 
home sector in particular.
The case was purposively selected for 3 reasons. First, 
Golden Living, a publicly traded company on the New York 
Stock Exchange since 1982, was purchased by private equity 
firm Fillmore Capital in March 2006 for about $2.3 billion. 
The period of private equity ownership was considered as 
long enough to study developments over time. Moreover, 
Golden Living was one of the largest LBOs in that period. 
The effects and strategies are therefore relatively well docu-
mented, and it makes the case very relevant from a welfare 
point of view. Second, Golden Living was acquired by a 
midsized private equity firm. The majority of private equity 
deals in health services is carried out by midsized private 
equity firms.21 Third, strategic changes in a company can be 
initiated by any new owner or leader of a company, whether 
it is a private equity owner or not.22 In 2000, a new President 
and CEO was appointed and the ownership transfer to 
Fillmore Capital was also accompanied by a new CEO in 
2006. Because we have gathered data for the period 2000-
2012, we were able to compare the leadership change with-
out private equity backing to the leadership change that was 
initiated by the new private equity owner.
It is important to note that Golden Living was already a 
large, New York Stock Exchange–listed public for-profit 
chain. The company converted from being publically listed 
and under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, 
to private equity ownership. This private ownership comes 
with far less regulatory scrutiny and compliance cost. While 
public companies are highly subject to short-term profit 
demands by market investors, private equity-owned compa-
nies have more latitude for longer-range strategic planning. 
The results of the case have to be interpreted against this 
background.
Data Sources
We triangulated qualitative and quantitative data sources as 
part of a deliberate search for confirming and disconfirming 
evidence. Our mixed-methods design had a longitudinal and 
comparative approach for both quantitative and qualitative 
data. We analyzed changes over time and contrasted strate-
gies and outcomes in our case with industry developments.
First, we analyzed qualitative data over the period 2000-
2012, as available in press releases, Provider Magazine, and 
reports of litigation actions. The annual top-50 information 
on nursing home chains in Provider Magazine, including an 
analysis of the main developments and strategies in the 
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industry of each particular year, served as the main back-
ground to compare the strategies of Golden Living to those 
of other US nursing home chains. We did a structured search 
in LexisNexis on the search terms “Golden Living” (965 
hits, selection of 88 articles) and “Beverly Enterprise” (996 
hits, selection of 134 articles) (a complete list of the docu-
ments studied is available from the authors). In addition, we 
interviewed purposively selected respondents: a central 
Golden Living executive, 2 representatives from private 
equity firm Fillmore Capital, the CEO of Golden Living, and 
an attorney involved in a class action lawsuit against several 
facilities of Golden Living. These qualitative data provided 
insights in the company’s strategies.
Second, we compiled a data set for Californian nursing 
homes (covering about 1200 facilities for each year), using 
cost report data of the California’s Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD) for the period 2000-
2012. We compared relevant outcomes for Golden Living 
facilities with regard to financial performance and resident 
well-being for the pre- and postpurchase period, and weighted 
the results for Golden Living against industry counterparts. 
For the analysis, we excluded nonprofit, government, and 
hospital-based facilities from the comparison group, because 
they have very different financial patterns. One limitation of 
the study was that we did not have access to company finan-
cial data after 2006 and California nursing home cost data 
may not have been representative of the company’s overall 
financial picture. Although there were no indications that the 
Californian Golden Living facilities differ strongly from the 
company’s facilities in other states, utmost care must be 
exercised while generalizing the data to the whole company. 
We added quantitative staffing data and deficiencies (viola-
tions of quality regulations) for all Golden Living facilities in 
the US compared with other US nursing homes from the 
Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data 
(covering about 14 700 facilities).
Concepts and Definitions
Our case study focused on the concepts corporate strategy, 
financial performance, and resident well-being.
Corporate strategy. Strategy was a central concept in this 
study, because we focused on “how” private equity is at 
work. Corporate strategy is about organization-wide changes, 
as initiated by top management. Strategy was approached as 
a combination of deliberately “planned” change and emer-
gent events “imposed” by environmental forces.23 Qualita-
tive data were the main data source for reconstructing 
strategy over 2000-2012. In addition, from the data sets, we 
regarded payer mix as an indicator of strategy, because nurs-
ing homes that focus on maximizing financial performance 
may shift resident census from Medicaid in favor of finan-
cially higher paying Medicare and private payers.13,24 Fur-
thermore, we also regarded staffing, as well as skill mix, as 
part of a deliberate strategy, because these variables give 
information about the management of labor costs. Staffing is 
also closely related to quality outcomes and often regarded 
as a structural measure of resident care quality.17,25
Financial performance. Financial performance included 4 
variables. First, we included operating and total margins, 
which have been regarded as traditional measures of finan-
cial performance in health care literature.13,26 In addition, we 
included data on the long-term debt/asset ratio (because pri-
vate equity firms may use relatively much debt in their port-
folio companies) and net income per patient day.1,2
Resident well-being. From the national OSCAR data set we 
included data on about 300 Golden Living facilities and total 
US nursing homes on total deficiencies, and serious deficien-
cies. Deficiencies are often used in academic studies as a 
measure of care quality.17,25 Nursing homes participating in 
Medicare and Medicaid are required by federal law to dis-
close all deficiencies. At last, data on litigation actions 
against the company reported in the news were identified. A 
definition of each variable included is provided in Table 1.
Data Analysis
Qualitative data from press releases as well as the interviews 
were categorized chronologically and then thematically con-
tent analyzed using software for qualitative data analysis 
(MaxQDA). We inductively added and specified codes while 
analyzing our data. We stopped adding new codes at the 
point of theoretical saturation. The qualitative data from the 
interviews supported and specified the findings on strategy.
Quantitative data were analyzed using Mann–Whitney U 
tests to compare the scores of Golden Living facilities with 
other Californian for-profit facilities, using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Furthermore, we 
conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests for each variable, to 
compare prepurchase period (2000-2005) and postpurchase 
period (2006-2012) scores. We only reported outcomes of 
the pre-post analyses if we found remarkable contrasts in 
comparison with industry trends. At last, the OSCAR data on 
staffing and deficiencies were analyzed using Satterthwaite t 
tests for unequal variances.
Results
Corporate Strategy
Mr. Floyd was appointed as the new CEO of Beverly 
Enterprises Inc in 2001. As the largest for-profit chain in the 
US, Beverly faced serious financial problems at that time, 
like many other nursing home chains. In spite of efforts to 
turn around the company, Beverly faced a large number of 
lawsuits alleging neglect of residents and deaths in states like 
Arkansas, California, and Florida. The company was subject 
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Table 2. Summary of the Main Strategies Executed.
Continuing strategies (both 
pre- and postpurchase) Postpurchase strategies
•• Divestmenta
•• Diversificationa
•• Intensified corporate 
control
•• Staffing level controla
•• Restructuringa
•• Rebranding
•• Relocation
•• Accelerated ICT investments
•• Increased skill mix and 
employee training and 
benefits
Note. ICT = information and communication technology.
aAn industry-wide trend: Strategy executed by many other for-profit 
nursing homes chains as well.
to a US Health and Human Services Department and US 
Department of Justice Corporate Integrity (oversight) 
Agreement from a 2000 settlement agreement for poor qual-
ity of care. As a result of these problems, Beverly company 
stock fell dramatically to less than $2 per share.
As the company’s financial status and its stock prices 
improved in the following years, it became the target of a “hos-
tile and secret acquisition of shares” by private investment firm 
Formation Capital. In 2005, Beverly’s board of directors there-
fore announced an auction process “to maximize value for all 
of the company’s stockholders as soon as practicable through a 
sale of the company.” In March 2006, private equity firm 
Fillmore Capital acquired Beverly Enterprises Inc, which was 
then renamed Golden Living. The ownership change was 
accompanied by a newly appointed 3-member board of direc-
tors, with Fillmore President Mr Silva as the new chairman. Mr 
Churchey was named CEO and was replaced by Mr Kurtz in 
2008. For the pre- and postpurchase period, many strategies 
were continued and reinforced, while the private equity owners 
also applied some new strategies (see Table 2).
Divestment and diversification. From 2001 onward, Golden 
Living divested more than 150 nursing home facilities, 
mainly motivated by high patient liability costs in states like 
Arkansas and Florida. When the company started its dives-
ture program, CEO Floyd explained that
Table 1. Concepts, Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources.
Variables Definition Data source
Corporate strategy
 General strategy Organization-wide changes, as initiated by top management Press releases, Provider 
Magazine, interviews
 Payer mix The percentage of revenue from Medicare, Medicaid (called Medi-Cal 
in California), and other payers (ie, the sum of revenues from self-pay 
patients, managed care patients and other payers).
California’s OSHPD for the 
period 2000-2012
 Staffing hours ppd Average number of staffing hours ppd, of direct care professionals: 
RNs, LVNs, and NAs.
OSHPD data 2000-2012 and 
OSCAR data for 2003-2012
 Skill mix RN productive hours/(LVN productive hours + NA productive hours). 
The composition of nursing staff by licensure/educational status.
OSHPD data 2000-2012
Financial performance
 Operating margin 
percentage
Net from Health Operations / Total Health Care Revenue. Focuses on 
core business functions and excludes the influence of nonoperating 
incomes and expenses.
OSHPD data 2000-2012
 Total margin 
percentage
(Total revenue – total expenses) / total revenue. Includes all operating 
and nonoperating revenues and expenses.
Idem
 Net income per patient 
day (ppd)
Net income of the company / total number of patient days.
 Long-term debt / asset 
ratio
Long-term debt / total assets. Percentage of assets that are financed 
with loans and financial obligations lasting more than one year. 
General measure of the financial position of a company.
Resident well-being
 Total deficiencies Deficiencies are issued to facilities that fail to meet the federal 
standards for Medicare and Medicaid participation. Deficiencies are 
classified into several categories on the basis of their scope and 
severity.
OSCAR data 2003-2012
 Serious deficiencies So-called level G or higher deficiencies, including those deficiencies that 
that cause harm or jeopardy to residents.
 Litigation actions Major lawsuits by the state or federal government or private parties 
reported in the media.
Press releases and reports of 
litigation actions
Note. OSHPD = Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development; ppd = per patient day; RNs = registered nurses; LVN = Licensed Vocational 
Nurse; NAs = Nurse Assistants; OSCAR = Online Survey, Certification and Reporting.
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this first group of [20] facilities . . . were expected to generate . . . 
less than six percent of our total revenues, but they accounted for 
20 percent of our total patient care liability costs projected for this 
year. . . . Except for disproportionately high liability costs, these 
would be very successful facilities.
Although some single nursing homes were closed down, most 
of the nursing homes were sold to other nursing home chains, 
real estate companies, or investment companies. The com-
pany mainly divested nursing home facilities, but there were 
other divestments as well, such as the divestment of 141 out-
patient therapy rehabilitation clinics and of 20 licensed home 
care agencies. Divesture was an industry-wide trend at that 
time: slashed Medicare rates and high leverage forced many 
nursing home chains to shed unprofitable facilities. The 
divestment of unprofitable nursing homes continued in the 
postpurchase period. By 2006, Beverly was the second largest 
US for-profit chain with 342 facilities and 35 839 beds.27 
After more divestment, Golden Living was ranked fourth in 
size with 302 facilities and 30 790 beds in December 2012.28
Mainly after 2004, the strategy of divestment was accom-
panied by diversification efforts. The company started to 
invest in new profitable services, such as rehabilitative ser-
vices, Alzheimer’s units, and hospice care. This diversifica-
tion strategy was implemented to attract more private-pay 
and Medicare postacute care revenue. CEO Floyd described 
the strategy as building Beverly “into a diversified eldercare 
services company, with ancillary businesses in the high-
growth, high-margin areas of healthcare services.” Again, 
diversification strategies were an industry-wide trend at that 
time. This strategy continued postpurchase, with a focus on 
the growth of home health and hospice business. Furthermore, 
new company development was added. Postpurchase CEO 
Kurtz explained:
We’ve created companies ourselves, diversifying the revenue 
stream. We created a rehab company, we created a hospice 
company, a pharmacy company, a staffing company. We’ll start 
a company that will provide transitional care management. So 
we create companies to create value.
Golden Living’s nursing homes often served as the essen-
tial business for the development of its newly created compa-
nies. For example, in 2012, Fillmore Capital launched 
pharmacy services company AlixaRx, for which Golden 
Living served as the necessary “launch customer”: AlixaRx 
started off with an agreement with Golden Living to provide 
pharmacy services to the company’s more than 300 centers. 
Fillmore Capital’s chairman of the board of directors Silva 
stated that “AlixaRx will be wildly profitable.”
In spite of this diversification strategy to attract more 
Medicare and private-pay patients, our analysis of the 
California OSHPD data showed the opposite: Golden Living 
served significantly more Medicaid patients from 2007 
onward. At the same time, from the private equity ownership 
in 2006 onward, the percentage of revenue from private pay-
ers was significantly lower than this revenue stream in other 
for-profit companies in California (see Table 3).
Table 3. Median Scores for Golden Living Facilities for 2000-2012; Compared With Other For-Profit Facilities in California.
Variables\year
Prepurchase Postpurchase
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Strategy
 Staffing hours ppd (California)
••   RN .33 .31 .31 .33 .39 .30 .22 .22 .28 .35 .45* .59** .68**
••   LVN .62 .63 .61 .61 .56 .63 .61* .71 .73 .72* .62** .50** .40**
••   CNA 2.15 2.21 2.26 2.33 2.39 2.38 2.57** 2.29* 2.29* 2.23** 2.24* 2.28* 2.31*
••   Total staffing (RN + LVN + NA) 3.10* 3.14 3.24 3.29 3.31 3.31 3.40 3.24** 3.29* 3.28** 3.31** 3.35** 3.44*
 Staffing hours ppd (US)a
••   RN .50** .51** .50** .50** .50** .55** .62** .68 .76* .76
••   Total staffing (RN + LVN + CNA) 3.06** 3.11** 3.11** 3.12** 3.16** 3.29** 3.35** 3.40** 3.44** 3.44**
 Skill mix .11 .11 .10 .11 .13 .10 .07 .09 .09 .12* .16* .21** .26**
 Payer mix
••   Medicare 11.70* 10.72* 10.11* 12.23 9.53 10.90 23.05** 12.19 13.13 12.36 12.19 11.81 11.57
••   Medi-Cal (Medicaid) 64.97 69.88 69.10 37.67 79.12 80.08 66.24 79.53* 79.03* 76.90* 79.27* 79.35* 79.86**
••   Other payers 23.90 20.91 17.47 17.58 9.58 6.94 8.28* 8.90* 7.84* 7.24* 7.82* 8.30* 6.92*
Financial performance
 Operating margin 5.56 9.87* 3.32 –3.81* –5.99* 1.33 12.54** 10.47** 9.13* 12.47** 11.34** 15.00** 8.99*
 Total margin −.77 –.82 –.91* –.96** –.87 −.81 −.62** −.83 −.74 −.72 −.64* −.71 −.60*
 Net income per patient day 5.18 9.69 3.19 –8.76* –5.82 1.49 25.35** 22.93** 20.82* 29.84** 18.23* 24.76* 13.61
 Long-term debt/asset ratio .78* .00 .00 .00 –66.67* –84.02* .00* 64.91** 68.77** .00 .00 .00 .00
Resident well-being
 Total deficiencies (US)a - - - 6.79** 6.29** 5.67** 7.47** 8.43 7.27** 7.95 7.29 7.67 7.19
 Harm deficiencies (US)a - - - .34** .33** .37** .52 .63 .41* .39 .43 .44 .27**
Note. Italic: Lower score than industry counterparts; all other scores are higher than those of industry counterparts. ppd = per patient day; RN = registered nurse;  
LVN = Licensed Vocational Nurse; CNA = Certified Nurse Assistant; NA = Nurse Assistant; OSCAR = Online Survey, Certification and Reporting; OSHPD = Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development. The scores for industry counterparts are available from the authors.
aThe mean US scores on staffing and deficiencies were derived from the OSCAR data set; the other scores were derived from the California OSHPD data.
*P < .05. **P < .001.
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Intensified corporate control. Both before and after the acqui-
sition, the respective boards executed a strategy of intensi-
fied corporate control. We found 3 manifestations of 
intensified control prepurchase. First, a new labor manage-
ment system was introduced to facilitate greater control over 
the use of staff and to reduce the use of temporary labor. 
Second, performance-related pay was introduced for manag-
ers. Each individual facility was judged by a scorecard, with 
factors such as pretax income, employee turnover, occu-
pancy, bad debt and quality of care. Third, local managers 
were given a smaller span of control, being responsible for 
approximately 10 homes each, about half the number they 
had been overseeing.
The private equity owners reinforced this strategy, by fur-
ther reducing the span of control of local directors; they now 
managed 6 to 8 nursing home facilities instead of 10. 
Postpurchase, the focus on performance-related pay was also 
enhanced. CEO Kurtz explained:
As part of the decentralization, we very dramatically increased 
the compensation for the leaders of our LivingCenters. . . . 
[Their] performance, both financial performance and clinical 
excellence, defines how their pay would be allocated. . . . They 
can almost double their salary. We tried to switch more of the 
salary to compensation based on performance rather than just 
base salary.
Control staffing levels. A strategy that emerged from the analysis 
of the data sets is the control of staffing levels, both pre- and 
postpurchase (see Table 3). We found that the total staffing 
hours per patient day (ppd) in California, while being highly 
comparable to industry counterparts prepurchase, became sig-
nificantly lower from 2007 onward. This trend also held for 
Certified Nurse Assistant (CNA) staffing hours ppd, and from 
2009 onward also for Licensed Vocational Nurse (LVN) staffing 
hours ppd, which were significantly lower for many years post-
purchase. In contrast, from 2010 to 2012, Golden Living had 
significantly higher RN staffing levels than its industry counter-
parts in California. The company stressed in its company infor-
mation and in interviews that it deliberately increased the 
number of RN caregivers. The skill mix (the proportion of 
higher educated nurses when compared to lower educated 
nurses) was indeed significantly higher from 2009 onward. 
While total staffing levels in California were lower during pri-
vate equity ownership, the composition of staffing changed in 
favor of higher educated nurses. The national data on staffing 
show a roughly similar pattern. However, here we see that the 
total staffing as well as the RN staffing were also significantly 
lower prepurchase, for the years 2003-2005. National data also 
showed a rise in RN staffing on the national level for 2010-
2012, with significantly higher RN staffing for the year 2011. 
Golden Living’s RN and total staffing levels increased after 
2008 consistent with the substantial staffing increase in US 
facilities, but its total staffing levels did not keep pace with the 
national trends.
Restructuring, rebranding, and relocation. Several postpur-
chase strategies mark a change when compared with the pre-
purchase period. A first change in this respect is the legal 
restructuring of the company, by adding new layers and 
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). With regard to the 
layering, Fillmore Capital created Pearl Senior Care LLC to 
purchase Golden Living. Pearl Senior Care in turn owned 
Drumm Investors, LLC, which in turn owned Golden Hori-
zons (the operation company) and Geary Property Holdings 
(the real estate). The operations were thus legally separated 
from the buildings and the land of the nursing home facili-
ties (see the chart in the appendix). Nursing home facilities 
in turn leased their buildings and land. Furthermore, Golden 
Living’s nursing homes were split up into separate LLCs. 
The extra layers and LLCs often hinder state and federal 
oversight of quality of care and make it more difficult for the 
government to hold the company accountable.29 The private 
equity owner stated that risk reduction for the lenders was 
the main argument:
Our lenders required, as part of the financing, each property and 
each operating company to be set up in LLC’s. It’s safer for 
them. If one goes bankrupt. . . . And there may be marginal 
litigation benefit.
However, the legal structuring was not a unique private 
equity strategy: By 2008, the top 10 US nursing home 
companies had converted most of their individual nursing 
facilities into LLCs, with separate management and prop-
erty companies and complex multilevel ownership 
structures.9,29
A second change that marked the new company owner-
ship was its rebranding. While the company was named 
Beverly Enterprises Inc at the moment of the takeover, its 
name changed to Golden Gate National Senior Care 
(GGNSC) at the time of the acquisition. A deliberate 
rebranding effort followed, including internal and external 
research among consumers and employees, resulting in the 
“Golden family” of company names. The nursing centers 
were named Golden Living. The new company name was 
supported by new logos and graphics. Private equity owner 
Mr Silva stated that
[the new name] sets the stage for what the company is going to 
represent in the future. We want it to become the leading brand 
in long-term care.
A third postpurchase change was the relocation of the com-
pany headquarters (where about 600 people worked) from 
Fort Smith (Arkansas) to Plano (Texas) in 2011. The Golden 
Living Administrative Center, providing administrative ser-
vices to all of the company’s businesses, remained located in 
Arkansas. An important reason given for the move was the 
high litigation costs in Arkansas. The Golden Living CEO 
indicated:
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It costs $ 17,000 per bed a year to defend against liability claims 
in Arkansas, versus a national average of $ 2,000 a bed per year. 
. . . It’s perverse to me that one of the leading long-term care 
companies is based in a state where they don’t have tort reform 
for nursing homes.
However, the company also stated that other factors 
pushed the move in 2011, such as travel expenses (consoli-
dating near a “large hub airport’ would save money), and a 
welcoming business environment (the State of Texas invested 
$2.1 million in Golden Living’s headquarters relocation).
Focus on information and communication technology and 
employee training and benefits. After the acquisition in 2006, 
our data point at an increased focus on both information and 
communication technology (ICT) and employee training and 
benefits. Although Golden Living reported ICT investments 
prepurchase, the number of ICT implementations accelerated 
postpurchase. New applications aimed at enhanced access to 
real-time electronic health record charting, resident assess-
ment and care planning, labor oversight, and cost reductions. 
CEO Kurtz stated that Golden Living “became much more 
sophisticated in the use of technology.” He explained,
We invested heavily in mobile technology. It’s all part of our 
strategy to try to become very efficient in giving information to 
our staff. Most of that information is about training, although 
we’re also using mobile technology to help in the billing process, 
so it’s more efficient how we bill. It also allows us to be more 
efficient in how we retrieve information.
In addition, qualitative data point at the investment in 
employee training and benefits. The company stated that it 
accelerated some employee compensations payments, and 
benefits, such as employer-paid life insurance, improved 
health care coverage, and discounts on auto and home insur-
ances, as part of the merger agreement. Golden Living also 
reported several investments in training. For example, it 
hired approximately 200 RNs as Directors of Clinical 
Education, who were responsible for clinical training for 
health care staff. Furthermore, the company stated that new 
CNAs were offered a 33-day course before they started 
working at Golden Living facilities. CEO Kurtz stated that
the company invested heavily in training. We think that is one of 
the most important things we can do, to maintain quality. . . . We 
are pretty focused on making sure that our people are very fluent 
in policies and procedures. We’re testing to make sure that they 
are fluent with their policies and procedures.
Financial Performance and Resident Well-Being
In addition to the strategies executed both pre- and postpur-
chase, we analyzed company scores on measures of financial 
performance and resident well-being (see Table 3).
Financial performance. Although Golden Living’s operating 
margins in California were relatively low in the 3 years pre-
ceding the takeover, the company structurally outperformed 
its industry counterparts postpurchase, showing higher oper-
ating margins. We also found higher net incomes per patient 
day in the postpurchase years, with significantly higher 
incomes for the years 2006 to 2011. We did not find the same 
results for total margins, which also includes nonoperating 
revenues and expenses.
The long-term debt to assets ratios of Golden Living’s 
California facilities (the total liabilities divided by total 
assets) were rising considerably in comparison with industry 
counterparts directly after the takeover, but the long-term 
debt ratios approached industry averages after those years. 
The long-term debt ratios were significantly higher for the 
postpurchase period for Golden Living facilities (Z = –2.46, 
P = .014). In contrast, other for-profit facilities in California 
showed significantly lower long-term debt ratios (Z = –7.34, 
P < .001) for the postpurchase period. Golden Livings’ long-
term debt ratios thus increased in association with the change 
in ownership.
Resident well-being. Golden Living scored significantly lower 
on the total number of deficiencies and on serious deficien-
cies nationwide prepurchase. This lower number of deficien-
cies might be related to the earlier mentioned divesture 
program, in which the company potentially divested rela-
tively deficient nursing homes. Postpurchase, mean scores 
were comparable to the national average for nursing facilities 
for most years, showing a shift to industry averages. This 
indicated that the private equity-owned company did not 
improve quality of care.
Our qualitative data show that sizable litigation actions 
occurred in both the pre- and the postpurchase period. As 
noted above, Beverly was placed under a Corporate 
Integrity Agreement with federal oversight for its failure to 
comply with quality and regulatory requirements in 2000 
which was removed in 2006 when the company was sold. 
In 2002, the company settled a case for elderly abuse with 
the California Attorney General, paid more than $2 million 
in penalties and fines and promised to improve the quality 
in all its facilities. It also settled a case with the Arkansas 
Attorney General for mistreatment and neglect of residents 
in 12 nursing homes in 2005. After purchase, Golden 
Living settled a $20 million suit with the US Department 
of Justice (USDOJ) and the California Attorney General 
for false reimbursement for medical equipment by a sub-
sidiary company in 2006. In 2011, a class action case for 
inadequate staffing levels in California Golden Living 
facilities was filed and later settled. Pennsylvania’s attor-
ney general also filed an action against Golden Living for 
inadequate staffing levels and fraudulent billing in 2012. 
The USDOJ intervened in an Alabama whistleblower suit 
against Golden Living’s AseraCare hospice company in 
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2012. Finally, the USDOJ reached a 2013 settlement with 
Golden Living for providing inadequate wound care in 
Georgia (filed in 2010) that required a Corporate Integrity 
Agreement for federal oversight. However, the four other 
largest US chains also had a number of litigation actions.11 
Golden Living had litigation actions similar to other large 
US nursing home chains. Litigation actions, because of 
poor quality, continued to occur after the private equity 
purchase, which indicates that the private equity-owned 
company was not able to improve care quality, ie, resident 
well-being.
Conclusion
Research on the impact of private equity in health ser-
vices shows mixed findings, as outcomes vary with pri-
vate equity owner’s strategies and the company context. 
We therefore shifted the focus from “what” the impact of 
private equity is to “how” private equity can have an 
impact in health services organizations. Our longitudinal, 
in-depth case study of the nursing home chain Golden 
Living generally shows how the private equity owner 
mainly continued and reinforced strategies that were 
already in place prepurchase. Examples of ongoing strat-
egies are the intensification of corporate control, diversi-
fication of services, and divestment of nursing home 
facilities. Under private equity ownership, Golden Living 
further pursued a strategy of low staffing levels in com-
parison to the national average in both the pre- and the 
postpurchase periods. Its gradual increase in staffing over 
time did not keep pace with the national growth in staff-
ing in most years. It should be noted that Golden Living 
and most other for-profit nursing homes, in contrast to 
nonprofit and government nursing homes, do not meet 
the minimum staffing levels for providing safe care rec-
ommended by experts and by the government.30,31 At the 
same time, the private equity owner invested in the com-
position of staffing, in favor of the higher educated nurses 
(RNs), which is in contrast to former research on skill 
mix.16Golden Living chose a strategy of “brains” (fewer 
high-paid high-educated nurses) over “hands” (many 
low-paid low-educated nurses).
The private equity owner also developed some new strate-
gies in the postpurchase period, such as the rebranding of the 
company, increased investment in employee benefits and 
training, the relocation of the company’s headquarters, the 
establishment of nursing home facilities as LLCs, rising debt 
ratios directly after the takeover, and the separation of the 
nursing home operating companies from the property 
company.
Many of the strategies executed under private equity 
ownership mimic industry-wide trends, as the strategies of 
strict staffing controls, divestment, diversification, and the 
restructuring of the company in LLCs were consistent with 
developments in other for-profit chains.9,15,17,29,32Moreover, 
scores on care quality indicators remained relatively low, 
as well as total staffing levels. We conclude therefore that 
the private equity-owned company under study mainly 
conformed to other large for-profit nursing home chains. 
This is in line with theory about institutional isomor-
phism33 that stresses the similarities between organizations 
as a result of imitation or independent development under 
similar constraints. The case study thus revealed how pri-
vate equity owners merely reinforced the profit-seeking 
strategies that were already in place prepurchase and added 
some strategies to further support efficiency, such as accel-
erated ICT investments.
Furthermore, apart from operational strategies or 
financial engineering strategies (the extraction of wealth 
without necessarily adding value),34 our case study 
revealed how the private equity owner created financial 
value beyond the company itself by executing a novel 
strategy. The private equity owners used Golden Living 
as a “launch customer” for putting new companies on the 
market, which had guaranteed income by contracting 
with the Golden Living nursing home facilities. This 
could explain why the private equity firm holds onto the 
nursing home chain relatively long, as most LBOs last 
only 3 to 7 years. Like other nursing home chains, the 
company used its related-party contracts to extract prof-
its from the nursing facilities.35 This finding uncovers a 
limitation of research on private equity, because it is 
mainly restricted to what happens within one portfolio 
organization.
The presented case study shows the need to study private 
equity buyouts in health services from a broad perspective, 
because this can shed new light on what happens when pri-
vate equity takes over.
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Appendix
The legal restructuring results in the following simplified chart.
Main source. Ernst & Young, Report of Independent Auditors GGNC Holdings LLC. Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements Periods Ended December 
31, 2007 and 2006. 2008. USA.
Note. The chart does not take into account the nursing homes that retain the name Beverly Healthcare, which is the case for around 80 homes.  
GGNSC = Golden Gate National Senior Care.
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